NIPFP Working Paper 84
[PDF]
M. Govinda Rao and Tapas K. Sen
February 2011
Abstract
This paper attempts to analyse the experience of incentivising economic reforms at the state level through central transfers to states. It reviews the experiences of the central government introducing incentives for reform directly through various specific purpose transfers as well as the incentive schemes recommended by various Finance Commissions. The incentive schemes directly introduced by the central government include, accelerated irrigation benefit programme, accelerated power development and reform programme, Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission, education and health sector reforms. The reforms recommended by the Finance Commissions include incentivising tax reforms and fiscal restructuring and consolidation.
The review of the experiences of Indian fiscal federalism shows that the incentivising reforms have neither been an unqualified success nor have they been a total failure. There are interesting lessons to be learnt from the experiences for both designing the incentive schemes and implementing them. The paper summarises the lessons of experience. While incorporating these in designing and implementing incentive schemes can be useful in the short and medium term, what matters in the long run is the political incentive for reforms.
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Federalism and Fiscal Reform in India
Sunday, February 6, 2011
How to Measure Inflation in India?
NIPFP Working Paper 83
[PDF]
Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah and Giovanni Veronese
February 2011
Abstract
What is the best inflation measure in India? What inflation measure is most relevant for monetary policy making in India? Questions of timeliness, weights in the price index, accuracy of food price measurement, and inclusion of services prices are relevant to the choice of measure. We show that under present conditions of measurement, the Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers (CPI-IW) is preferable to either the Wholesale Price Index or the GDP deflator.
Wednesday, February 2, 2011
Indian Social Democracy: The Resource Perspective
NIPFP Working Paper 82
[PDF]
Vijay Kelkar and Ajay Shah
February 2011
Deficit Fundamentalism vs Fiscal Federalism: Implications of 13th Finance Commission’s Recommendations
NIPFP Working Paper 81
[PDF]
Pinaki Chakraborty
January 2011
Abstract
The Thirteenth Finance Commission’s recommendation to increase the vertical share of tax devolution to states will help, but its horizontal distribution formula leaves much to be desired. One, its design is such that two of the four key indicators are in conflict with each other. Two, the Commission’s revised road map for fiscal consolidation at the centre and the states, which recommends state-specific, year-wise, fiscal adjustment paths, not only limits the fiscal manoeuvrability of states but also impinges on their fiscal autonomy. Three, its design of the grant for elementary education has the potential to reduce the expenditure of states rather than augment it. The need to look at intergovernmental transfers from the right perspective of federalism, where the states and the centre are seen as equal partners in development and not from a narrow technocratic viewpoint, cannot be stressed more.
Sunday, January 30, 2011
Reforming the Indian Financial System
NIPFP Working Paper 80
[PDF]
Ajay Shah and Ila Patnaik
January 2011
Monday, January 24, 2011
India's Financial Globalisation
NIPFP Working Paper 79
[PDF]
Ajay Shah and Ila Patnaik
January 2011
Abstract
India embarked on reintegration with the world economy in the early 1990s. At first, a certain limited opening took place emphasising equity flows by certain kinds of foreign investors. This opening has had myriad interesting implications in terms of both microeconomics and macroeconomics. A dynamic process of change in the economy and in economic policy then came about, with a co-evolution between the system of capital controls, macroeconomic policy, and the internationalisation of firms including the emergence of Indian multi-nationals. Through this process, de facto openness has risen sharply. De facto openness has implied a loss of monetary policy autonomy when exchange rate pegging was attempted. The exchange rate regime has evolved towards greater flexibility.
Monetary Policy Transmission in an Emerging Market Setting
NIPFP Working Paper 78
[PDF]
Rudrani Bhattacharya, Ila Patnaik and Ajay Shah
January 2011
Abstract
Some emerging economies have a relatively ineffective monetary policy transmission owing to weaknesses in the domestic financial system and the presence of a large and segmented informal sector. At the same time, small open economies can have a substantial monetary policy transmission through the exchange rate channel. In order to understand this setting, we explore a unified treatment of monetary policy transmission and exchange-rate pass-through. The results for an emerging market, India, suggest that the most effective mechanism through which monetary policy impacts inflation runs through the exchange rate.