Who cares about the Chinese Yuan?

NIPFP Working Paper 89
[PDF]

Vimal Balasubramaniam, Ila Patnaik and Ajay Shah
May 2011

Abstract

The rise of China in the world economy and in international trade has raised the possibility of a rise of the Yuan as an international currency, particularly after the Chinese authorities have undertaken policy initiatives such as Yuan settlement and Yuan swap lines. In this paper, we measure one dimension of Yuan internationalisation: the role of the Yuan in the exchange rate arrangements of other economies. While the magnitudes are small, our findings show that as many as 34 currencies in the world have been sensitive to movements in the Yuan. This suggests that the Yuan potentially has a significant role to play in global exchange rate arrangements. Contrary to popular belief, however, we find a limited role of the Yuan among Asian economies.

Did the Indian Capital Controls Work as a Tool of Macroeconomic Policy?

NIPFP Working Paper 87
[Link]

Ila Patnaik and Ajay Shah
April 2011

Abstract

In 2010 and 2011, there has been a fresh wave of interest in capital controls. India is one of the few large countries with a complex system of capital controls, and hence offers an opportunity to assess the extent to which these help achieve goals of macroeconomic and financial policy. We find that the capital controls were associated with poor governance, were unable to sustain the erstwhile exchange rate regime, and did not support financial stability. India's experience is thus inconsistent with the revisionist view of capital controls. Macroeconomic policy in India has moved away from the erstwhile strategies, towards greater exchange rate flexibility combined with capital account liberalisation.

The Exchange Rate Regime in Asia: From Crisis to Crisis

NIPFP Working Paper 69
[PDF]

Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah, Anmol Sethy and Vimal Balasubramaniam
May 2010

Abstract

Prior to the Asian financial crisis, most Asian exchange rates were de facto pegged to the US Dollar. In the crisis, many economies experienced a brief period of extreme flexibility. A ‘fear of floating’ gave reduced flexibility when the crisis subsided, but flexibility after the crisis was greater than that seen prior to the crisis. Contrary to the idea of a durable Bretton Woods II arrangement, Asia then went on to slowly raise flexibility and reduce the role for the US Dollar. When the period from April 2008 to December 2009 is compared against periods of high inflexibility, from January 1991 to November 1991 and October 1995 to March 1997, the increase in flexibility is economically and statistically significant. This paper proposes a new measure of dollar pegging, the “Bretton Woods II score”. We find that by this measure Asia has been slowly moving away from a Bretton Woods II arrangement.